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From a highly decorated general, a brilliant new way of understanding war and its role in the twenty-first century.
Drawing on his vast experience as a commander during the first Gulf War, and in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Northern Ireland, General Rupert Smith gives us a probing analysis of modern war. He demonstrates why today’s conflicts must be understood as intertwined political and military events, and makes clear why the current model of total war has failed in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other recent campaigns. Smith offers a compelling contemporary vision for how to secure our world and the consequences of ignoring the new, shifting face of war.
From the Trade Paperback edition.
- Sales Rank: #251497 in eBooks
- Published on: 2007-01-16
- Released on: 2007-01-16
- Format: Kindle eBook
From Booklist
In his opening remarks, Smith provocatively states, "war no longer exists." Of course, he does not mean that mass organized violence has ended; rather, he refers to the end of large-scale industrialized warfare characterized by the use of massive tank columns supported by the application of intensive air power. Smith, who spent 40 years in the British army, including service in the first Gulf War, Bosnia, and Northern Ireland, maintains the development of nuclear weapons has essentially made such warfare obsolete. Current and especially future wars fought by Western powers are likely to be low-intensity conflicts, often waged against stateless opponents. Because it is not practical or even possible to win these struggles through the application of purely military force, Smith insists a revolution, or new paradigm, must occur in our conception of these struggles. As a start, we must understand the political context in which our adversaries act. Once identified, political objectives must always drive the military efforts, Smith insists, even at the expense of "sound" military strategy. Jay Freeman
Copyright � American Library Association. All rights reserved
Review
“One of the most important books on modern warfare in the last decade. We would be better off if the United States had a few more generals like him.” —The Washington Post Book World
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“An impressive and absorbing work of military analysis. . . . Smith is the Clausewitz of low-intensity conflict and peacekeeping operations. . . . He brilliantly lays bare the newfound limits of Western military power.” —The New York Times Book Review
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“It is hard to overstate the devastating nature of this book as an indictment of almost everything the West has done in recent years, and is doing today.”�—The Sunday Telegraph
“A closely argued, searching textbook on strategy and the efficient use of military power in the post-Cold War era.”�—The New York Times
From the Trade Paperback edition.
About the Author
General Rupert Smith spent 40 years in the British Army, commanding the UK Armoured Division in the Gulf War, general in charge in Northern Ireland, commander of the UN forces in Bosnia and Deputy Commander of NATO. He lives in London.
Most helpful customer reviews
8 of 8 people found the following review helpful.
Incredible Observations on History of War - Muddled Prescriptions for the Future
By Dianne Roberts
Hindsight is always going to be more clear than trying to predict the future, and in this book where General Smith traces the history of war from the Napoleonic to the current age it is no surprise that he is far more clear and insightful looking backward than he is in looking forward.
The major thesis of his book is that war has shifted from what he calls "War Between the People," typified by separate nation-states fighting till decisive victory on a distinct battlefield, to what he calls "War Amongst the People" which will feature conflict including non nation states, waged indefinitely and indecisively on an amorphous front that includes both physical lands and intangible ones such as the media.
The book is very strong in several regards. First, General Smith's elucidation of Clausewitzian strategy, as well as providing the historical backdrop for when, how and why it was developied, is simply first rate. The biggest lessons drawn from Clausewitz that are still relevant today are that force must be applied to achieve some pre-determined purpose (hence the "utility of force," it is not merely the destruction of your opponent), and the concept of the trinity of government, military and the people. The best way to defeat an enemy is to break this trinity. In War Between the People this could be done conceptually more simply by flat out destroying the enemy military or their government, or perhaps more elegantly by dissolving the people's allegiance to the policies of their government and military, more effective against a democracy such as North Vietnamese efforts to reinforce and inflame the anti-war movement. Second the book's military history from Napoleon to the end of the Cold War is truly outstanding, worth the price of the book itself.
Smith is certainly not alone in sensing a major shift in the type of wars we have found ourselves in for the past nearly two decades now, and in pointing out the intellectual bankruptcy of our "Revolution in Military Affairs," more a techno-advertisement than a strategic realignment of our military forces based on an understanding of our current world and the permanence of human nature. In his new War Amongst the People the Clausewitzian trinity of government, military and people still exists, clearly and distinctly for state actors, but in a much more diffused and maleable way for non state actors such as terrorists. Therefore breaking their trinity becomes a much more confusing and difficult thing to achieve, -but none the less necessary- and much of the military theory for fighting the wars of the past are no longer applicable.
Unfortunately his prescriptions for how to fight our current and future wars, beyond the simple and now hopefully universally agreed upon maxim that your war must have a vision of peace you want to achieve by expending your blood and treasure, are complex and ultimately confusing. Due to being deployed to the Middle East and out of internet access for 6 months I have had to wait that long to write my review for this book, and can barely remember any of his concepts and suggestions for fighting and winning future wars, which doesn't bode well for someone trying to develop a new conceptual framework for our warriors and our society for facing the future. The biggest thing I do remember though is a much more coordinated effort needed between the military, the state department, aid groups, and especially the media. He also appears fatalistic that Wars Amongst the People are essentially intractable and will require a practically permanent peacekeeper presence like we have in the former Yugoslavia, where he commanded forces during the fighting, and developed and employed much of his thinking, and where his final chapters focus. (There is little direct application of this thinking to Iraq and Afghanistan.)
The Utility of Force is an excellent work nonetheless, and highly recommended for people trying to understand the current state of the world and what we can actually do to protect ourselves. For counterpoint the works of Lt. Col. Ralph Peters are suggested too.
9 of 9 people found the following review helpful.
The Impressionists were Trained as Realists
By TigerTC
General Rupert Smith's "The Utility of Force" is an excellent book that explains how modern "war" has evolved from full-scale "industrial war" to modern "war amongst the people." General Smith drew on his long and distinguished military career in the British Army and his own experiences in Kuwait, Bosnia, and Ireland to produce this book. In "The Utility of Force," he brings Clausewitz to the 21st century and attempts to explain why the Western militaries are not always successful.
After an excellent discussion of Clausewitz, the Napoleonic era, and the development of the general staff, Smith traces the evolution of warfare through the 19th century through WWII, tracing the gradual transformation of conflict into total "industrial war." General Smith argues that, although nations still prepared for total war during the Cold War, the "industrial war" that culminated in WWII was made obsolete by the development of nuclear weapons. Smith's overview of military history is solid, but although he interjects Clausewitzian insights and begins to develop his concept of "war amongst the people," at times it is a bit mundane.
The post-WWII world has seen the emergence of "war amongst the people," and this is what Smith argues too many current leaders - political and military - have not adapted to. Algeria, Vietnam, Afghanistan, the Balkans, and now Iraq are all examples of war amongst the people. Smith identifies six characteristics of war amongst the people: military force is indecisive without supporting political action; the fight is amongst the people and not on a battlefield; the conflicts are timeless; we fight to preserve the force rather than risking all to gain a military objective; new uses are found for old weapons; and the sides are mostly non-state, both multi-national organizations and non-state parties or groups.
Smith concludes with recommendations on how modern states can adjust to the new paradigm of war amongst the people. He argues that the militaries can transform themselves to fight the new war (he points out that the Impressionist artists were trained as Realists; they used the same tools and medium to see the world anew), although I believe it will be difficult to change the conservative mindset of the modern Western military. Just as importantly, though, political leaders must understand how to employ military force as part of a larger policy and realize that military objectives don't solve the problems of war amongst the people. Finally, Smith concludes that war amongst people is best conducted as an intelligence and information operation.
This is an excellent book, and Smith does a fantastic job tying Clausewitzian concepts into the modern world, although his recommendations at the end of the book are easier to write than to implement. At times this book reads like Wesley Clark, recommending the measured use of force to support political goals; at other times (when describing Smith's command in Bosnia), it reads like General Romeo Dallaire's "Shake Hands with the Devil," as Smith describes the maddening difficulties of commanding a multi-national force that is handicapped by a lack of political will. This book should be read by anyone interested in the modern military or in modern foreign policy or politics.
7 of 7 people found the following review helpful.
Powerful Tour de Force on the subject of WAR - Order it NOW!!!
By Richard of Connecticut
General Smith's book can be summarized as EXTRAORDINARY. There are probably no more than a handful of generals in our country that understand what Smith is getting at, and that is most unfortunate. For this man has the capacity to completely alter the way we conduct our wars, and our policies, which precede war, but then again, the politicians would have to be listening - wouldn't they?
What Smith does in an absolutely brilliant, seductive, and necessary way is help lift you up to a different level where you can understand for the first time a TEMPLATE to explain how these wars worked. What was the REAL DEAL? What did they have in common?
INDUSTRIAL WAR
The theme of this book is that for hundreds of years, everyone involved in thinking about war had a solid understanding of war as an INDUSTRIAL WAR. This is a war where all the resources of a nation are mobilized, including the industrial capacity of a nation in the action of war. You fight army against army in an open field, if you win, you continue to advance until such time as you dominate the opposing country's capital, and then they capitulate.
First GULF WAR was INDUSTRIAL
The first Gulf War in 1990 was an Industrial War. Saddam's armies had uniforms, tanks, and artillery, fought in formation, and communicated as any industrial army would communicate. In 2003, for the first 29 days of our second invasion into Iraq, we also fought an INDUSTRIAL WAR. We destroyed his army, and marched to the capital Baghdad, the same way we marched to Berlin in World War II.
Once we were successful in destroying Saddam's government however, a new war emerged, what General Smith refers to as WAR AMONG THE PEOPLE. Our generals are the best in the world at waging INDUSTRIAL WARS, but they were totally unprepared for this new paradigm. Even though they had spent years fighting this new type of war in Viet Nam, they just continued to imagine to themselves that they were fighting an INDUSTRIAL WAR, and therein lays our problem.
WAR AMONG THE PEOPLE
The author points out that our entire psyche as a country and our military and political leadership thinks in terms of every war, every action as Industrial War. It is this template, this paradigm that has led to serious miscalculations, and even in the case of Viet Nam a most UNSATISFACTORY result.
The new war is called a WAR AMONG THE PEOPLE, similar to Guerilla Wars. It involves an enemy who doesn't wear uniforms, doesn't fight in formations like brigades, regiments, or battalions, and doesn't fight for physical territory like towns and cities. The enemy LIVES WITH INNOCENT MEN, WOMEN, AND CHILDREN, and camouflages himself by blending in. WARS AMONG THE PEOPLE have included:
1) Peninsular War 1808 - 1814
2) Boer War 1899 - 1902
3) The Arab - Ottoman Turk War remember Lawrence of Arabia in 1916
4) Malaysian War
5) Indonesia late 1950's - early 60;s
6) Algerian War late 1950's
7) Viet Nam - 1945 - 1975
8) Iraq 2003 to Present
In the eight instances above, not one of these wars was an INDUSTRIAL WAR. In no instance was mass army pitted against mass army, industrial might against industrial might. Only in Iraq 2003 to Present, during the first 29 days was it an industrial war. After that it became a WAR AMONG THE PEOPLE, and that is where we find ourselves today, with all of its difficulties. To quote Smith, "INDUSTRIAL WAR NO LONGER EXISTS."
What is important to note is that in each instance, a vastly inferior society from the standpoint of industrial might, and military sophistication was able to do well against vastly superior societies in terms of resources.
At different times depending on how quickly the industrialized society REVAMPED its thinking, the industrial society prevailed as in Malaysia and Indonesia. In the Peninsular War, the Spanish guerillas wreaked havoc on the military genius of his age, Napoleon Bonaparte. The guerillas successfully tied down 300,000 of Napoleons prime troops. Think about it, here's a guy Napoleon that ripped apart empires, England, Russia, etc., and now he gets his army tied up in knots by guerilla forces dressed in street clothes for six years in Spain. It's telling you something.
And so the crucial theme you take away from General Smith's book is this concept of the Industrial War being the wrong mindset to think about most military engagements we will be involved in the foreseeable future. We must think in terms of WAR AMONG THE PEOPLE. These are the issues according to General Smith we need to reflect on:
A) Don't start a battle you can't supply - During the Civil War, the South could not supply its own army with the necessities of war. The South lost.
B) The enemy is always a reacting being that not only has no intention of falling in with your plans, but will actively be setting out to foil them p9
C) Throughout the Peninsular campaign England's Wellington used his British and Portuguese army by trading SPACE AND TIME. This meant Wellington would concede territory to Napoleon's army, and refused battle except on Wellington's terms. This is exactly what the Iraqi insurgents are doing to us. They are trading space for time. They won't engage except on their own terms, attempting to tire us out, to wait us out.
It will require a new level of thinking by a different breed of American politician who understands the concept of WAR AMONG THE PEOPLE. Do you or I care to make any bet on whether there is any American politician that has this type of thinking? In the interim, the best we can hope for is to READ THIS BOOK, get informed, and tell our fellow citizens about a new way of waging war. Good luck.
Richard Stoyeck
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